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Education is commonly held to be a key variable for an individual’s economic
success. Similarly, immigrants may benefit directly from their education, as they
would in their homeland or like natives in their destination country. On top of that,
more educated immigrants may be more effective in the transition to a new society
and thus may benefit relatively more from the education they bring from their
homeland and from any additional education they may acquire in their destination
country (Chiswick and Miller 1994, 2003; Chiswick et al. 2005; Bratsberg and
Ragan 2002). Thus, education is a core variable in analyses of immigrants’
economic success, and it is an important component in determining the differences
between natives and immigrants (Card 1999; Altonji and Blank 1999).
The literature on immigrants in Europe does not provide straightforward and
unequivocal support for the hypothesis that immigrants‘ education is rewarded in the
same monotonic relationship that holds for natives. Although returns to education
are usually lower for immigrants than for natives, the patterns found are sometimes
quite irregular. For example, Bevelander and Nielsen (2001) reported that for
Yugoslavian immigrants, the effect of education is the same as for Swedes, no matter
where they acquired it, whereas Nordic immigrants have less benefits from their
education if they acquired it in Sweden. Husted et al. (2001) analysed the position of
immigrants in Denmark, using six levels of education. For natives, the first four
levels beyond compulsory add some 10–15% to the wage rate, the highest level adds
some 30%. For refugees, the first five levels add nothing or even depress wages, and
levels six and seven add some 15%. For non-refugees, the first three levels add
nothing, the fourth depresses wages by 10%, the fifth adds 5% and the sixth adds 10
to 15%.
Several studies have indicated that it matters very much whether an immigrant’s
education has been acquired in the origin country before migration or in the
destination country. Friedberg (2000) even showed that properly accounting for
education obtained before migration can explain the initial earnings disadvantage of
immigrants. Existing studies that make the distinction never have direct observations
on the decomposition: It is always inferred, usually from highest level of education
attained and age at immigration (Friedberg 2000; Nekby 2002; Cortes 2004; an
exception is Kee (1993) who used direct observations for immigrants to The
Netherlands). The lack of a robust standard pattern of returns to education for
immigrants may well be related to a problematic measurement of their education.
However, it might just as well be a real phenomenon, given the substantial
heterogeneity by source country, motive and ease of entry in the destination
country’s economy.
In this paper, we shed some light on the issue by focusing on the benefits of
homeland education for refugees. We use registration by immigration officers
obtained when immigrants apply for admission to The Netherlands. We investigate
the quality of the data and then use the observations to assess the importance for
economic success during the first 5–6 years after admission. Our key finding is that
education beyond secondary does not yield any additional monetary returns. After
thoroughly testing for the reliability of this conclusion, we are convinced that this is
a real effect.
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In the next section we introduce our data. In Section 3, we discuss reliability of
registered education. Section 4 presents analyses of the effect of education on the
probability of employment and the probability of receiving a social benefit. Section 5
presents the analyses of the schooling effect on wages. Section 6 considers the




All immigration by non-Dutch citizens is registered in the Central Register Foreigners
(Centraal Register Vreemdelingen, CRV), using information from the Immigration
Police (Vreemdelingen Politie) and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service
(Immigratie—en Naturalisatie Dienst, IND). The CRV register records immigration
motive, and this allows identification of refugees. At our request, CBS, the Dutch
Central Bureau of Statistics, has linked the data to the Municipal Register of Population
(Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie, GBA). The GBA/CRV Register includes all non-
Dutch immigrants who legally entered The Netherlands during 1990–2001 and
registered in the population register, except those who have returned before January 1,
1998, those who naturalised to Dutch citizenship and those who have died.
It should be noted that the time of registration in the Municipal Register of
Population (GBA) significantly differs from the time of registration in the Central
Register Foreigners (CRV) because of possible illegal stay and the asylum
application procedure that can take up to a few years. As the register takes stock
every year on January 1, all immigrants leaving within the calendar year of arrival
remain unobserved. This means that information on short durations should be taken
from durations covering January 1. The information is biased if such spells of
immigration differ from spells shorter than 1 year that do not include January 1.
The GBA/CRV files have been linked by a unique identifier to observations in the
Regional Income Panel 1995–2000 (Regionaal Inkomens Onderzoek, RIO), created
by CBS. RIO is a panel of 2 million households, containing some 5 million
individuals, about one third of the population. Individuals leaving or (re-)entering
the household leave or (re-)enter the panel. The original GBA/CRV file includes
about 600,000 immigrants, from which about a third can be retrieved in the RIO
panel, thus generating a GBA/CRV/RIO file of some 200,000 immigrants.
Naturalised immigrants are maintained in the RIO sample. The resulting GBA/
CRV/RIO dataset is called the Immigrant panel. Essentially, it covers a third of all
immigrants who registered in the GBA between 1990 and 2000 provided they have
not left before January 1, 1998, and it records socio-economic data for the years
1995–2000. The Immigrant panel includes 53,000 refugees and gives panel
information on labour income, the number of weeks worked and on socio-economic
classification. The classification is based on the dominant income source during the
year: employee, self-employed, on disability, social assistance or unemployment
benefit, other (mostly non-participating, without an individual income). Labour
income itself is taken from fiscal records and has very high reliability.
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The immigrant panel does not include information on level of education of
immigrants. Therefore, we use two other sources. The first is a file for asylum
migrants who applied for asylum between 1995 and 2000 (called IND/ITS file). The
application document has an entry for all immigrants, but immigration officers
consider education mostly irrelevant for their purpose and often do not bother to
report it. Institute for Applied Social Sciences (ITS) Nijmegen has coded the
information but only for refugees, for the period 1995–2000.1 The second source is a
register of the government employment agency Centre for Work. and Income (CIW)
that has assessed education for individuals who have contacted CIW to find a (new)
job, obviously a very selective group.
The Immigrant panel contains about 53,000 refugees, of whom 43,000 satisfy our age
constraint (15–59). We searched this sub-sample of 43,000 refugees in the IND/ITS and
CWI file, using a unique common identifier and successfully found 16 339 refugees in
both files. Some 27,000 refugees could not be traced in the IND/ITS file. The Immigrant
panel contains those who registered in the GBA between 1990 and 2000, whereas the
IND/ITS file contains asylum applicants from 1995 to 2000; checking the effect of this
difference in time frame, we estimate that matching would be impossible for about 65%
of the 27,000. The remaining part of the loss can be explained by the lag between the
time of asylum application and the registration in the GBA, which is described below
and no doubt some noise in the records. Finally, we matched the sample of 16,339
refugees with the CWI file. These matches provided two education variables: one from
the IND/ITS file and another from the CWI file but both with substantial error. Below,
we will assess the quality of information on education in detail.
2.2 Refugees
Asylum migrants (refugees) enter as applicants for asylum. Registered asylummigrants
are immigrants who have been admitted and immigrants waiting for a decision on their
asylum application. Admitted refugees are those who have obtained a title of residence;
valid titles are temporary status (permission to stay until the situation in the home land is
safe), A status (recognised as refugee and granted permanent residential status), “AMA”
(admitted independents under 18) and admission for humanitarian reason. Admitted
asylum migrants in principle are always registered in the GBA. Registration for asylum
applicants is variable. If they are registered in the GBA at all, registration takes place
several months after application. Since 1998, there are two special arrangements for
asylum applicants. Under Zelfzorgarrangementen (Independent Housing), refugees
find their own housing, with friends, relatives or otherwise. In this case, they will
always directly be registered in the GBA. Under Central Housing, Centrale Opvang
voor Asielzoekers takes care of housing. Asylum applicants in Central Housing are
registered in the GBA when they obtain asylum status or after spending 1 year in
Central Housing (since June 2000, after spending 6 months). Most applicants were
registered when they left Central Housing. This means that the group of asylum
migrants contains an unknown share of asylum applicants, i.e. an unknown mixture of
admitted migrants and applicants for admission.
1 We are very grateful to ITS for their generous offer to add their coding to our dataset.
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2.3 Timing of events
The population register shows date of entry in the municipal register of population
and keeps track of the immigrant’s address. For the timing of events, we create three
variables: years since migration (YSM), time spent waiting for a decision on the
asylum application (Statuswait) and time spent in The Netherlands as an
undocumented immigrant (Undocyears). The standard procedure for an asylum
seeker is to be registered at the border by the Immigration Service, wait for a
decision on the application for admission and in case of a positive decision, be
registered in the population register as a resident. We denote the moment of
registration by the Immigration Service as year of arrival, the moment of registration
in the population register as year of settlement. We take registration in the population
register as the moment of entry into Dutch society, as then a status has been granted
and only then the immigrant is allowed to work and start building up rights to social
security benefits. We measure YSM as time elapsed since settlement. The time
elapsed between arrival and settlement is spent waiting for a decision on the
application and is defined as Statuswait. In exceptional cases (3.6% in our sample),
immigrants have been registered as settlers in the population register before they
applied for admission as refugee with the Immigration Service. This could happen
because of initial tolerance of undocumented immigrants: When the rules were
tightened, these immigrants decided to apply for a formal status. We denote the time
elapsed between registration in the population register (settlement) and status
application (arrival) as undocumented years in cases where the former came before
the latter. We should point out, however, as noted above, that the moment of
registration in the population register was not always unequivocally defined. In
perhaps 10% of the cases, applicants were registered in the population register while
the decision on their application had not yet been taken. The definitions of these
variables are summarised in Appendix B.
2.4 Selection of the sample
We will analyse data for refugees who are still present in The Netherlands in 2000,
13,436 out of 16,339; of these, we have 31,323 observations on the period 1995–
2000. Following an entry cohort and, hence, using information on returned
immigrants as well is not an attractive alternative, as it would only be feasible for
cohorts entering in 1998 or later: It would restrict the analysis to fairly recently
arrived immigrants only. We might also have opted for using all observations in the
database up to their last moment of observation; final observations for individuals
would then refer to 2000 or to year of departure if earlier. Our choice implies that we
do not observe individuals that have left before 2000. This would be disturbing if
return migration is selective. We are fairly confident that this is not the case,
however. Our sample is restricted to those who have a valid permit to stay. We can
observe departures for arrivals in 1998 or later. Among those with a permanent
residential status in that sample, we only observe five people who have left (out of
perhaps some 10,000 admissions). Those with a temporary permission to stay may
be expelled when their homeland is declared safe (e.g. former Yugoslavia). In that
case, return migration is an exogenous event and need not worry us.
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By year of arrival, the sample spans the decade of the 1990s, but most
observations date from 1996 or later: 3.6% arrived in 1990–1995, the remainder in
1996–2000. There is also some attrition from using the household as a sampling
unit. The initial recording covers all members of a household; if someone later
leaves the household, this means leaving the sample. Sample characteristics are
given in Appendix A.
To create a reasonably homogenous sample, we require individuals to have a
valid permit to stay, and we exclude individuals whose application is still being
processed. As noted above, the sample also contains individuals who are still in the
application process but are already registered at the GBA. This number is unknown
but very small. The records contain many statements on the applicant’s formal status,
but there is no track record of progress in the decision-making process. Dates of
decisions are not registered. Therefore, we decided to stay on the safe side and
distinguish only three categories: A status (permanent permission to stay; includes
also immigrants granted Dutch citizenship in 2001), AMA (entered as independent
minor, i.e. not older than 18) and preliminary status (all other). Presumably, AMA
refers to status upon entry, A status and preliminary status refer to the situation in
2000 (as last recorded status); status updates (by IND) occur, but the date of last
recording is not known. Table 1 gives the distribution by status and country of origin.
In our sample of refugees, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries each contribute
about one fifth, 11% are from former Yugoslavia; Iran, Somalia, Sudan and the
Soviet Union each contribute some 5–6 and 3% are from China. About two thirds of
the refugees have a preliminary status, just more than a quarter has A status and 6%
are AMA. AMAs are mostly from China and Somalia. Among the refugees with A
status, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan are over-represented.
3 Measuring education
We are specifically interested in the relevance of homeland education for socio-
economic position after immigration, but we have reason to be suspicious about the
reliability of recorded education. The original documents may register the applicant’s
education, but if so, registration is not according to a standardised classification
system. ITS analysts have coded the entries to a standard classification in nine
Table 1 Admissions by title of residential status and country of origin
A status (%) AMA Preliminary Total (N=100)
Iran 42.14 0.74 57.12 674
Iraq 35.51 0.32 64.17 3,123
Somalia 15.90 15.33 68.76 874
China 1.17 53.38 45.45 429
Afghanistan 37.19 1.05 61.76 2,947
Sudan 28.45 4.38 67.17 594
Former Yugoslavia 27.52 0.16 72.33 1,272
Soviet Union 28.08 2.91 69.01 755
Other countries 16.11 13.51 70.38 2,768
Total 28.36 6.20 65.44 13,436
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categories (see Appendix B). From analysis by ITS, we know that education is
missing in many cases and that there is reason for doubting the reliability of the
recorded levels. We also know that education is not an important variable in the
decision process and that immigration officers have no special interest in it. In fact,
they consider it irrelevant and often ignore it. Hence, before attempting any analysis,
we should assess the quality of measurement.
Table 2 presents the distribution by education levels, distinguished by country of
origin. The first thing to note is that in 45% of the cases, education is missing. Seven
percent has no education at all, 23% has basic (including extended basic), 14% has
secondary and 11% has tertiary education. If among missing recordings individuals
have the same distribution by education as those who are observed (which may well
be true, see below), 13% of all refugees would have no education at all, and more than
half (55%) would have no more than extended basic education. Fifteen percent would
have a higher education. This points to a rather unequal distribution of education.
Refugees from China, of whom many are AMA, have remarkably low levels of
education and so have refugees from Somalia. Among the refugees from Iran, there
is a remarkably high share with secondary education; Sudan has relatively many
highly educated refugees, and the distribution from the Soviet Union is rather
bimodal: high shares with extended lower and with high education. Refugees from
Iraq are often well educated. In the total sample, 20% has primary education, 27%
secondary, 8% tertiary and for 45% education is missing. By title of residential status
(not shown here), refugees with A status have higher average education level, and
AMAs have lower average level of education. Among all refugees, 28% has A
status, whereas among refugees with tertiary education, 43% has A status.
We also have observations on education recorded by the CWI, the public
employment service that assists individuals in finding a job. Registration as job
seeker is a requirement for obtaining social benefit. Clearly, this registration is highly
selective. However, we might assume that employment service agents are more
dedicated in registering education, as it is an important instrument for the service
they have to provide: They have an interest in accurate assessment. However, they
might also apply censoring and only register education they consider relevant for the
Dutch labour market. We do not know whether individuals have obtained any
additional education in The Netherlands. Upon a first visit to the employment
agency, this seems unlikely, but with later visits, an update might have taken place.
From Table 3, we may note first of all that the missing observations do not match:
They are not concentrated as single diagonal entry in the cell (missing IND and
missing CWI). Missing observations must result from different processes in the two
agencies and are not a unique property of the respondent. The overall proportions are
about equal, at 45% for IND and 49% for CWI, but this must be coincidence, as IND
missings are due to non-registration by the immigration officer, whereas CWI
missings must be due to absence of contact with the employment service.
Interestingly, the proportion of missing observations on IND education is virtually
the same for every level of CWI education. If we are justified in assuming that CWI
registration is reasonably reliable, this would imply that missing observations in IND
are unrelated to the level of education and hence that the distribution of observed
education is representative for all refugees: We can relate the frequencies to only
those individuals for whom education has been registered.
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There is certainly no agreement between IND and CWI on individuals’ level of
education. Table 4, with education registered in three comparable levels, shows this
quite clearly. If we consider only cases for which both institutions record an
education level (i.e. exclude missing observations), the diagonal elements in Table 5
would be 0.50, 0.65 and 0.65, meaning that for the given classification by CWI, in
no more that two thirds of the cases would IND record the same level.
With levels of education grouped in primary, secondary and tertiary (to allow for
matching classifications), we can calculate that in 6.8% of all cases, the IND level is
higher than the CWI level, whereas in 5.1%, the reverse holds (13,436 cases, 2,593
with primary, 2,966 with secondary and 1,467 with tertiary education, CWI
classification). This points to some upward bias in the IND registration relative to
the CWI registration, as one might have anticipated: IND is the individual’s
assessment without any check; CWI coding is based on the registration by an
Table 4 Education IND and education CWI, three levels
CWI
IND Primary Secondary Tertiary Missing Total
Primary 28.06 14.20 1.58 23.24 19.83
Secondary 25.13 36.64 16.28 26.03 27.12
Tertiary 3.60 5.82 34.82 5.63 8.45
Missing 43.22 43.34 47.32 45.10 44.60
Total 100 100 100 100 100















9.09 9.99 5.69 1.33 1.00 0.66 8.68 6.97
1–3 year
primary
3.74 4.17 2.97 0.96 0.14 0.26 3.41 2.90
4–5 year
primary
5.88 5.78 4.17 1.33 0.14 0.40 4.35 3.86
Primary 4.81 8.47 7.08 3.91 0.29 0.26 6.80 6.10
Extended
primary
13.9 11.68 14.74 9.14 1.85 1.32 11.3 10.54
Secondary,
general
6.95 9.49 13.35 20.58 9.56 4.50 10.13 11.06
Secondary,
vocational
0.53 2.57 3.67 5.68 3.71 1.06 2.44 2.90
Some
tertiary
2.67 1.48 1.64 5.01 5.71 5.17 2.16 2.63
Tertiary 8.56 3.20 3.23 8.85 28.96 40.26 5.63 8.45
Missing 43.85 43.17 43.45 43.22 48.64 46.09 45.10 44.6
Total
(N=100)
187 2,372 1,581 1,356 701 755 6,484 13,436
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Table 5 Determinants of employment and benefits: coefficients and relative risk ratios (RRR) of the
multinomial logit model; estimated using the pooled sample
Employment Benefits
Coefficient Std. Error RRR Coefficient Std. Error RRR
Age −0.03*** 0.003 0.97 0.05*** 0.003 1.05
Woman −1.29*** 0.054 0.28 0.01 0.051 1.01
YSM 1.27*** 0.094 3.54 1.24*** 0.091 3.46
YSM2 −0.12*** 0.028 0.89 −0.25*** 0.023 0.78
YSM3 0.01** 0.004 1.01 0.02*** 0.003 1.02
YsmIraq −0.09 0.075 0.91 0.00 0.077 1.00
YsmSomali −0.28*** 0.085 0.75 0.06 0.091 1.06
YsmChin 0.54*** 0.145 1.71 0.34*** 0.112 1.41
YsmAfgh 0.15* 0.079 1.16 0.52*** 0.082 1.69
YsmSudan 0.16 0.110 1.18 0.32*** 0.123 1.38
YsmYugos 0.04 0.080 1.04 −0.05 0.094 0.96
YsmSovU −0.07 0.096 0.93 −0.23** 0.093 0.79
YsmOther −0.09 0.071 0.92 −0.18** 0.079 0.83
arrival95 (reference)
arrival96 0.42*** 0.084 1.52 0.44*** 0.083 1.56
arrival97 0.65*** 0.094 1.92 0.18** 0.093 1.20
arrival98 0.64*** 0.101 1.89 −0.56*** 0.104 0.57
arrival99 0.15 0.145 1.16 −0.87*** 0.149 0.42
arrival00 0.44 0.316 1.55 −0.49 0.333 0.61
No education (reference)
edu1_3 y 0.11 0.171 1.12 0.20 0.184 1.22
edu4_5 y 0.20 0.155 1.23 0.22 0.148 1.24
EduPrim 0.38*** 0.135 1.46 0.15 0.137 1.16
EduPrim_ext 0.53*** 0.119 1.70 0.49*** 0.117 1.64
eduSec_gen 0.45*** 0.120 1.56 0.48*** 0.114 1.62
eduSec_voc 0.79*** 0.165 2.21 0.44*** 0.156 1.55
EduHigh_some 0.76*** 0.169 2.13 0.39** 0.169 1.48
EduHigh 0.67*** 0.128 1.94 0.47*** 0.119 1.60
EduMiss 0.38*** 0.104 1.47 0.14 0.100 1.15
Iraq 1.06*** 0.197 2.89 0.16 0.186 1.18
Somalia 1.13*** 0.223 3.10 −0.14 0.232 0.87
China −1.20*** 0.382 0.30 −0.39 0.268 0.68
Afghan 1.09*** 0.196 2.97 −0.45** 0.189 0.64
Sudan 0.99*** 0.231 2.68 0.10 0.234 1.11
Yugoslavia 0.76*** 0.213 2.14 −0.07 0.216 0.94
SovietUni 0.32 0.240 1.38 1.10*** 0.207 3.00
Other 0.20 0.200 1.22 0.22 0.191 1.24
Iran (reference)
A_Status 1.02*** 0.066 2.78 2.47*** 0.062 11.85
AMA 0.03 0.099 1.03 1.86*** 0.114 6.43
Undocyears 0.56*** 0.035 1.75 0.15*** 0.036 1.17
Statuswait −0.68*** 0.093 0.51 −0.31*** 0.077 0.73
Naturalised 0.82*** 0.075 2.27 0.81*** 0.075 2.25
Returned −1.11*** 0.189 0.33 −1.39*** 0.278 0.25
Married −0.14** 0.056 0.87 0.54*** 0.053 1.72
Amsterdam 0.16 0.096 1.17 0.68*** 0.100 1.97
Rotterdam −0.44*** 0.113 0.65 0.10 0.108 1.10
The Hague −0.26** 0.110 0.77 0.22** 0.102 1.24
Utrecht 0.18 0.159 1.20 0.07 0.200 1.07
Constant −3.45*** 0.252 0.03 −5.03*** 0.242 0.01
Number of persons 13,436
Number of person-years 31,323
Log Likelihood −22,103
χ2(92) 7,588
The multinomial logit model estimated has three outcomes: employment, benefits and non-participation,
which is the reference category. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on person ID.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (Standard errors are robust)
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employment agency that has interest in accurate assessment. The employment agents
translate foreign education into the guessed Dutch equivalent and might perhaps be
inclined to some downward bias because of unfamiliarity with foreign schooling
systems. However, the bias is quite modest, which lends credibility to the IND data.
We have analysed possible patterns of non-recording of education by IND officers
by running a logistic regression. Registration of education is indeed related to some
variables: Education is more often registered for immigrants who are older at arrival
and for men, it is better known for later arrivals, and there are significant differences
between countries of origin: better known for China, Soviet Union and Somalia, less
often known for Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. “Undocyears” (years spent without
residential permit) and “Statuswait” (time spent waiting for a decision on the
application) also have significant, negative effects on the probability of registration.
We have made inquiries with IND and with immigration officers who do the intake
interviews and registration of immigrants. They could not give any explanation on the
pattern of registration of education, and they are absolutely unaware of any systematic
effects.
We conclude that non-recording of level of education by IND has different
incidence by country of origin, years of arrival and gender of the refugees, but there
is no indication of a systematic rule applied by immigration officers. We do not see
any reason to fear that non-registration of education is related to level of education.
Neither do we see any indication that non-registration or erroneous registration
would be related to unobserved ability of applicants. From comparing IND and CWI
registration, we conclude that there is evidence of only modest upward bias in the
level of education recorded by IND. However, the substantial variation in the cross-
classification of the two registrations indicates that measurement error in the level of
education is far from negligible.
We have considered using information on homeland occupation (also coded by
ITS) as a variable to assess the reliability of registered education. However, a cross-
tabulation of education and occupation shows wide dispersion of education by
occupation. Moreover, many educations are so low and so little specific that it would
be hard to use the additional information to test the reliability of education. There are
auto mechanics and farm hands with tertiary education and pharmacists with just
extended basic education. The matrix is simply too far removed from diagonality to
yield useful additional information. A logistic regression shows no relation between
recording education and recording occupation.
With more than one measurement of an individual’s education, it is possible to
deduce information on the magnitude and effect of measurement errors. Kane et al.
(1999) found that problems are more severe for incomplete educations than for
completed degrees. Just as Battistin and Sianesi (2006), they stressed that with
categorical data, measurement error cannot be classical, as the upper and lower limits
on education imply that errors depend on true level of education. Below, we deduce
some information on the possible magnitude of measurement error in the continuous
case, with education measured in years. In our estimates in Sections 4 and 5, we test
robustness of results by restricting the sample to cases where the two measures of
education are identical. This, of course, does not fully exploit all the information in
the data, but neither does it require additional assumptions (Kane et al. assumed
independent measurement errors, which may well be violated in our case).
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Formalising, we have two measures of an individual’s education, SiT as measured
by IND and SiC as measured by CWI, both measured in years (we have translated
education levels to years, as specified in Appendix B). Assume:
SiT ¼ Si þ eiT ð1Þ
SiC ¼ Si þ eiC ð2Þ
Both measurements report individual i’s true education but with different
measurement errors. Assuming that the errors are independent of the true value,
we can write for the variances:
VT ¼ V þ VeT ð3Þ
VC ¼ V þ VeC ð4Þ
where V measures the variance of true education across individuals, and Ve measures
the variances in the error terms.
We can write the covariance VCT as
VCT ¼ E SiT  E SiTð Þð Þ SiC  E SiCð Þð Þf g
¼ E SiT  E Sið Þð Þ SiC  E Sið Þð Þf g;
ð5Þ
under the assumption of zero-expected measurement error and independence of true
education levels. Substituting the definitions (1) and (2), we can write this as





where ρ is the correlation between eiT and eiC. From the three Eqs. 3, 4 and 6, we can
identify the three variances if we know (or make assumptions on) the correlation
between the two measurement errors. The variance in IND education is 16.50, the
variance in CWI education is 13.67 and the covariance is 8.38. With these numbers,
substituting Eqs. 3, 4 and 6 and squaring, we can solve the resulting quadric
equation for V. Solving the equations for given values of the correlation coefficient
gives the results plotted in Fig. 1. Measurement errors in IND recordings are always
larger than in CWI recordings, as one would anticipate. As the squaring may permit
solutions that are not solutions to Eq. 6 itself, we check whether solutions to the
quadratic also obey Eq. 6 itself.2 It turns out that the positive root holds for negative
correlation and the negative root holds for positive correlation. It seems fair to rule
out negative correlation between measurement errors, as it would be hard to explain
(an employment officer “punishing” an immigrant for lying to the IND?). Intuitively,
it seems reasonable to assume that the correlation will be somewhere in the range 0
to −0.7. Then, with correlation 0, true variance would be 8.38, IND measurement
variance 8.12 and CWI measurement variance 5.29. With correlation at 0.7, V would
be 11.03, VeT 5.46 and VeC 2.63. The values imply that in the IND records, the ratio
V/(V+VeT) runs between 0.51 and 0.67. In an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression with years of education as single explanatory variable, this ratio would
give the estimated regression coefficient as a proportion of the true coefficient. With
2 We are grateful to the referee who corrected the neglect of this condition in our original version.
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more than one explanatory variable, all coefficients are biased downwards, but it is
hard to determine the magnitudes (Wooldridge 2002, p. 75). Unfortunately, in logit
and probit regression, the effect of measurement errors on estimated coefficients is
unknown, and one cannot assume analogy to linear regression.3 The indication of
substantial measurement errors in education is reason for concern. We will use the
double measurement of education to check the reliability of our results.
4 Socio-economic status
We have estimated the effect of education and other variables on socio-economic
status, distinguishing three states: Yi=1 if individual i is employed as employee or
self-employed, Yi=2 if person i does not work and receives some social benefit
(unemployment, welfare) or Yi=3 if individual i neither works nor receives a benefit
(non-participating). Considering these three states, we have estimated a multinomial
logit model using pooled data, using all available observations for a given
individual, in different years (with correction of the standard errors for repeated
observations per individual), as a panel estimation of a multinomial logit model is
hard to construct and estimate (we have also estimated two sets of random effect
panel logit models, with work versus non-work, benefits versus non-benefits, and
work versus non-participation, benefits versus non-participation; the key conclusions
are similar). Non-participation is defined as the reference category. Unemployment
benefit and welfare are not distinguished, as the number of individuals receiving
unemployment benefit is very small (only 56 person-years) during the whole panel
period 1995–2000. The model has been estimated on all individuals who are present
in 2000. We do not include refugees who have returned home before 2000 or apply
correction for such attrition. As noted above, among those admitted permanently
(with an A status), no one leaves, and among those admitted temporarily, departures
are exogenous, dictated by the political situation in their homeland.
Admitted immigrants have identical entitlements to social security benefits as the
native Dutch. However, unemployment benefits are conditional on work history,
Fig. 1 Variances as a function of the correlation coefficient
3 Private communication, professor J.S. Cramer, University of Amsterdam. As Cramer (2003, Section 5.3)
shows, omitted variables lead to a downward bias in discrete models.
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which will disqualify immigrants in the early years after arrival. Social assistance
does not depend on length of stay in The Netherlands but is means-tested at the
household level and may disqualify marital partners or children (although the level
of the benefit will depend on household composition). Refugees are provided shelter,
food and a small amount of cash while their application is in process.
Formally, individual i’s contribution to the likelihood function in state j is







where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables for individual i in year t, bj is a vector
of coefficients, varying with three alternative outcomes and the coefficients for
reference outcome 3 (non-participation) are normalised to zero. The time subscript
on X is actually excessively general: Only YSM and city of residence are time
varying; all other variables are measured at arrival. We estimate probabilities of work
and receiving benefits using the pooled sample of the panel period 1995–2000.
Because each individual contributes more than once to the sample, standard errors
are adjusted for the intra-individual correlation (we give robust standard errors). We
do not correct standard errors for possible intra-household correlations because
asylum migrants are usually single (male) individuals. Because the estimated
coefficients of a multinomial logit model are difficult to interpret directly, we report
relative risk ratios as well. The relative risk ratio measures the effect of a variable on
the probability of outcome j relative to the probability of the reference outcome.
In Table 5, we report estimation results for the probability of work in the most
extended specification. We control for cohort effects with dummies for year of
arrival and note that although we also include the time profile of YSM, earlier
arrivals do better. Differences between countries of origin are marked. For some
countries, there are differences in level only; for other countries, the interactions
between country dummy and YSM are also significant. We will return to country
effects in Section 6. Among the residential locations, Rotterdam and The Hague
stand out with lower probabilities of employment. Age at arrival has a negative
effect (age squared, when added, had insignificant effect), women are less likely to
work than men. We have also considered the effect of the situation in the year after
our observation interval. Those who will be naturalised in 2001 are more likely to
work, and those who will then have returned (or administratively removed) are less
likely to work. The latter result hints at selectivity in return migration, in spite of our
earlier remarks. Undoc years have a positive effect: Refugees who have been in The
Netherlands as undocumented workers before reporting to IND have a higher
probability to work. This is as anticipated: As undocumented workers, they will
mostly have worked, and effectively, this adds experience to their YSM. Statuswait
has a negative effect. Spending more time in the application procedure reduces the
probability to work, even after controlling for the other duration variables.
YSM, i.e. time elapsed since registration in the population register GBA, has a
monotonic positive effect on the probability to work, as one might expect. We
estimated a cubic function for YSM to obtain maximum flexibility, although this
cannot be extrapolated very far, as we only estimate over a 5-year interval. We have
plotted the profile in Fig. 2.
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Our special interest is in the effect of home country schooling. Generally, there is a
positive effect of schooling on the probability to work. Considering magnitudes and
significance levels, one may distinguish three steps: less than basic education, basic up
to secondary general and secondary vocational and higher. The probability of work
increases markedly between steps and is quite similar within the steps. Interestingly and
perhaps not surprisingly, the effect of secondary level schooling is split: Secondary
vocational education has a stronger effect on the probability of work than secondary
general education. This suggests that vocational skills are directly transferable, whereas
general academic skills are not. Within the highest step, the effect of education
diminishes slightly, although not significantly. Before checking the reliability of the
results for education, we will discuss the results for benefit recipient status.
The probability of receiving a social benefit differs by country of origin, increases
for more recent arrival cohorts, is higher for older and married individuals but not
different for women and, among cities, is highest in Amsterdam. Undocyears has a
positive effect, whereas Statuswait has a negative effect. Refugees who are no longer
present in 2001 have a lower probability of recipient status and refugees who have
become naturalised in 2001 have a higher probability; these results also indicate that
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Fig. 2 Predicted probability of employment and benefit status over time elapsed in The Netherlands
(years since migration YSM)
4 The status of naturalised and returned may have materialised subsequent to measurement of the
dependent variable. In this case, including these variables may bias coefficient estimates. Nevertheless, we
include these informative variables because the real decision on naturalisation and returning home may
well have been made earlier. Besides, the impact of omitting these variables on coefficient estimates has
been proved to be negligible.
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YSM has a positive effect that peaks at 3 years (Fig. 2). The effect is initially
positive, as refugees have to build up entitlements (for example, if they have been
registered in GBA before obtaining residential status, they will only be entitled to
social assistance once they have obtained their status). Later, the profile declines as
the immigrants find jobs.
The effect of education is essentially a single jump at extended primary
education. Individuals with education below that level have the same probability
of receiving benefits; individuals with that level or higher share a significantly
higher benefit probability. One might perhaps have anticipated that the effect
would be negative, as those with a higher education would be better able to find
a job. It is not quite clear how to interpret this unanticipated finding. It may be a
reflection of the build-up of benefit entitlement with work history, as the results
for work and benefit are to some extent parallel: Higher education leads to
higher probability of work, which also leads to increases in the probability to be
eligible for social benefits. However, there are very few individuals who receive
unemployment benefits. Perhaps the means testing for entitlement of assistance is less
binding for the higher educated. The highly educated individuals may be better at
negotiating to get access to the social system.
As we are specifically interested in the effects of homeland education, we have
concentrated our analysis of reliability on the effects of education. We have made
separate estimations on sub-samples, and we attempted to allow for the reliability of
recorded levels of education. In Table 6, we present estimates of probabilities for
employment and benefit, on five sub-samples: arrivals 1995, arrivals 1998–2000,
men, women and excluded if education missing. A generally positive effect of level
of education on the probability of employment but without university education
ranking on top is confirmed in all these regressions. The estimates confirm a strong
positive effect of secondary vocational education. The parabolic effect of education
is more noticeable in the 1995 cohort (model II) than in the 1998–2000 cohort
(model III). This is rather surprising, as it suggests that lagging employment
probability of the university educated increases over time; one might have
anticipated the reverse effect. The results for the probability to receive social
benefits estimated on sub-samples also basically repeat the findings for the full
sample: There is no monotonic relationship between benefit recipient status and level
of education. The relatively stronger effects for women compared to those for men
(compare model V with model IV) might have some relationship with building up
unemployment benefit entitlement from work (the effect of education on work is
also stronger), but it may also be that more highly educated women are less sensitive
to the means test restriction than men are.
To test the sensitivity of our results for the reliability of recorded education, we
have made selections based on the combination of IND and CWI records (Table 7),
by discarding “unreliable” recordings of education. We defined “unreliable” as clear
mismatch in the two measurements. The first selection rule we applied, reported
under model II, is the following:
IND primary or less Accepted if CWI classification Basic
IND extended primary and secondary Accepted if CWI lower or intermediate
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IND secondary vocational, some tertiary Accepted if CWI intermediate or higher
vocational
IND higher Accepted if CWI university
Because of the difference in the two classification systems, this is not a strict
criterion to a perfect match, so some noise is inevitably left. We therefore also used
as an alternative selection rule that the classifications should agree on the level of
primary/secondary/tertiary. We then estimated two specifications: the usual specifi-
cation with all IND categories (model III) and a specification with three levels only
(primary/secondary/tertiary; model IV). By requiring a credible match between IND
and CWI classification, we reduce the sample to those observations for which CWI
classification is available. This is quite restrictive and certainly not random.
Therefore, we also re-estimated the non-restricted versions on the sub-sample for
which both IND and CWI education levels are available. This is reported as model I.
The restriction of the sample to individuals with observations from IND and from
CWI has an effect on estimated coefficients: Significant coefficients increase for the
employment equation (often by 30% or more) and decline in some specifications for
Table 6 Testing on sub-samples: selected coefficients of multinomial logit models
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Employment
edu1_3 y 0.11 0.07 −0.40 0.08 0.06 0.12
edu4_5 y 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.42 0.21
EduPrim 0.38*** 0.50* −0.14 0.40** 0.17 0.39***
EduPrim_ext 0.53*** 0.63** 0.32 0.41*** 0.68*** 0.54***
eduSec_gen 0.45*** 0.75*** 0.51** 0.31** 0.72*** 0.46***
eduSec_voc 0.79*** 1.37*** 0.41 0.61*** 1.18*** 0.72***
EduHigh_some 0.76*** 0.87** 0.48 0.48** 1.28*** 0.74***
EduHigh 0.67*** 0.83*** 0.69*** 0.50*** 0.97*** 0.63***
EduMiss 0.38*** 0.44** 0.35* 0.26** 0.48**
Benefits
edu1_3 y 0.20 −0.32 0.44 0.11 0.27 0.21
edu4_5 y 0.22 0.44 0.08 −0.02 0.46** 0.23
EduPrim 0.15 0.34 −0.10 0.31 −0.10 0.14
EduPrim_ext 0.49*** 0.83*** 0.22 0.40** 0.57*** 0.50***
eduSec_gen 0.48*** 0.85*** 0.11 0.41** 0.54*** 0.47***
eduSec_voc 0.44*** 0.94*** −0.64 0.39* 0.39 0.46***
EduHigh_some 0.39** 0.53 0.07 0.08 0.74*** 0.39**
EduHigh 0.47*** 0.70*** 0.08 0.38** 0.54*** 0.48***
EduMiss 0.14 0.26 0.10 0.05 0.20
Number of persons 13,436 1,645 5,599 8,453 4,983 7,444
Number of person-years 31,323 5,677 8,612 19,651 11,672 17,471
The multinomial logit models are estimated with the same variables as in Table 5 in addition to the
education variables presented in Table 6, but their coefficients are not presented here. Non-participation
is the reference category. Robust (clustered) standard errors.
Model definitions: Model I, reference (full sample); Model II, sub-sample of individuals arrived in 1995
according to IND; Model III, sub-sample of individuals arrived between 1998 and 2000 according to
IND; Model IV, sub-sample of men; Model V, sub-sample of women; Model VI, sub-sample of individuals
for whom education is known (non-missing)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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the benefit equation. However, two key conclusions remain unaffected. The
probability of employment increases in steps with the level of education but is not
highest for the highest level of education. The probability of receiving benefit is not
monotonically declining in the level of education but if anything is closer to a
parabolic relationship. If we restrict education levels to (matching) primary,
secondary and tertiary only, we find that employment and benefit probabilities are
equal for secondary and tertiary educated individuals and above the probabilities for
those with primary education only.
5 Earnings
In Table 8, we present estimates for earnings for employees; that is, individuals for
whom labour earnings are the most important source of income during the year. It is
the natural logarithm of annual labour income divided by weeks worked and deflated
Table 7 Restricting the sample to matching education: selected coefficients of multinomial logit models
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Employment
edu1_3 y 0.29 0.70** 0.70**
edu4_5 y 0.33 0.58** 0.57**
EduPrim 0.51*** 0.78*** 0.66**
eduPrim_ext 0.68*** 0.94*** 0.95***
eduSec_gen 0.66*** 0.85*** 0.93***
eduSec_voc 0.83*** 1.06*** 1.62***
eduHigh_some 0.97*** 1.08*** 1.53***




Edu1_3 y 0.29 0.52* 0.31
Edu4_5 y 0.33* 0.36* 0.27
eduPrim 0.14 0.25 0.22
eduPrim_ext 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.35*
eduSec_gen 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.46***
eduSec_voc 0.42** 0.43** 0.60**
eduHigh_some 0.46** 0.59** 0.42
eduHigh 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.45**
eduINDsec 0.27**
eduINDter 0.29*
Number of persons 3,884 2,993 2,301 2,301
Number of person-years 10,637 8,337 6,354 6,354
The models are estimated using the sub-samples described with the same variables as in Table 5 in
addition to the education variables presented in Table 7, but their coefficients are not presented here.
Non-participation is the reference category. Robust (clustered) standard errors
Sub-samples are defined according to the following rules: Model I, all IND categories if CWI
classification is available; Model II, all IND categories; observations excluded according to the ‘first
selection rule’ in the text: Model III, all IND categories if the IND and CWI classifications are agreed on
three levels; Model IV, three levels IND categories if the IND and CWI classifications are agreed on three
levels
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 8 Panel GLS random effect estimations of log weekly earnings, 1995–2000
Weekly wages Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Age 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04***
Woman −0.46*** −0.43*** −0.30*** −0.43***
YSM 0.26*** 0.37*** 0.24** 0.26*** 0.22** 0.21***
arrival96 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.09 0.13**
arrival97 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.13 0.11
arrival98 0.18*** 0.16** 0.19 0.03
arrival99 −0.09 −0.11 −0.14 −0.20
arrival00 0.65** −0.10 1.17** 0.63*
edu1_3 y 0.00 0.62*** 0.15 −0.07 0.27 0.00
edu4_5 y 0.21* 0.45** 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.23**
EduPrim 0.28*** 0.49*** 0.11 0.31*** 0.00 0.28***
eduPrim_ext 0.36*** 0.74*** 0.38* 0.32*** 0.41** 0.39***
eduSec_gen 0.31*** 0.51*** 0.17 0.32*** 0.10 0.34***
eduSec_voc 0.21* 0.45** −0.33 0.18 0.31 0.21*
eduHigh_some 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.06 0.23*
EduHigh 0.20** 0.18 0.21 0.21** −0.03 0.24***
EduMiss 0.13* 0.20 0.28 0.14 −0.01
Iraq 0.35** 0.13 0.27 0.41** 0.08 0.08
Somalia 0.65*** 0.61** 0.75** 0.66*** 0.50 0.51**
China −0.23 −0.56 0.53 −0.10 −0.79 −0.51
Afghan 0.29** 0.18 0.31 0.35** 0.03 0.14
Sudan 0.61*** 1.40*** 0.17 0.65*** 0.75 0.53**
Yugoslavia 0.61*** 0.89*** 0.27 0.61*** 0.55* 0.46**
SovietUni 0.38* 0.30 −0.19 0.26 0.44 0.35
OtherC 0.51*** 0.88*** 0.30 0.48*** 0.63** 0.33
A_Status 0.02 −0.03 0.02 0.06 −0.10 0.00
YsmIraq −0.05 −0.02 −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 0.06
YsmSomali −0.08 −0.12 −0.13 −0.05 −0.15 −0.04
YsmChin 0.17* 0.20 −0.37 0.10 0.44** 0.27**
YsmAfgh −0.03 −0.01 −0.09 −0.04 0.02 0.03
YsmSudan −0.02 −0.28*** 0.11 −0.01 −0.18 0.04
YsmYugos −0.08* −0.21*** −0.12 −0.07 −0.12 −0.02
YsmSovU −0.03 0.02 0.15 0.03 −0.10 0.00
YsmOther −0.05 −0.20** −0.13 −0.03 −0.10 0.02
AMA 0.10 0.32** −0.67** 0.12 −0.11 0.16
Undocyears 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.05 0.14*** 0.08 0.12***
Statuswait −0.14*** −0.16 −0.09 −0.19*** −0.04 −0.14**
Married 0.19*** 0.19** 0.11 0.18*** 0.19** 0.23***
Amsterdam 0.08 0.28** −0.12 0.03 0.46*** 0.02
Rotterdam 0.14* 0.39*** 0.31 0.13 0.16 0.22**
DenHaag 0.16** 0.26 0.26 0.15* 0.29 0.08
Utrecht 0.03 0.03 −0.10 0.02 0.17 −0.02
Constant 2.36*** 1.56*** 3.03*** 2.37*** 2.10*** 2.60***
sm 0.70 0.69 0.37 0.70 0.66 0.70
s" 0.71 0.61 1.06 0.71 0.71 0.67
η 0.49 0.56 0.11 0.50 0.46 0.52
R-sq Within 0.10 0.23 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.12
Between 0.24 0.40 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.25
Overall 0.25 0.40 0.12 0.20 0.31 0.26
N-person 3,703 737 859 2,926 777 1,882
N-person-year 5,933 1,424 1,045 4,762 1,171 3,088
The dependent variable is the logarithm of weekly earnings for the period of 1995–2000 in the prices of
1995. sm is standard deviation of individual random effect, μi; s" is standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic errors, ɛit; η is fraction of total variance because of ɛit.
Definitions of sub-samples: Model I, basic specification; Model II, arrivals 1995 (IND registration); Model
III, arrivals 1998–2000 (IND registration); Model IV, men only; Model V, women only; Model VI,
observations with education missing deleted
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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by cost-of-living (base year 1995). We estimate the following panel generalised least
squares (GLS) model with random effects (Wooldridge 2002, ch.10).
yit ¼ X itbþ μi þ "it t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ð8Þ
Where yit is earnings of individual i in period t, xit is a vector of individual
characteristics, b is the corresponding coefficient, μi is the individual random effect,
which is assumed to be uncorrelated with xit and to satisfy E mið Þ ¼ 0, E m2i
  ¼ s2m
and ɛit is idiosyncratic errors that are strictly exogenous, E "tið Þ ¼ 0, serially
uncorrelated, E "it"isð Þ ¼ 0; all t 6¼ s and have a constant unconditional variance in
time, E "2it
  ¼ s2" . Defining a composite error term as nit ¼ mi þ "it; the variance of
νit is E n2it
  ¼ s2m þ s2" and E νitνisð Þ ¼ σ2μ; for all t 6¼ s.
The basic specification given in column 1 has been found after testing for several
interaction effects and alternative specifications that will be pointed out as we
discuss the main findings below. Among the alternatives, we have separate estimates
for men and women and separate estimates by year of arrival. The latter distinction
has been made, as before, to check if certain effects become more pronounced as
immigrants have been in The Netherlands for a longer period of time. We have also
estimated interaction effects with YSM; these were generally insignificant.
The gradient for age at arrival is fairly steep, with an annual growth rate of some
4%. The result is quite robust across specifications, but it drops if we estimate
separately for later arrival cohort, suggesting that the disentanglement of age and
YSM is less than perfect. There is a strong and very substantial positive direct effect
of YSM. Quadratic effects of age and YSM have also been tested, but they were not
significant. The effect of arrival year is fairly uniform for the first 3 years. The strong
positive effect for the latest cohort may be a selectivity effect: These are refugees
who can work right in their first year of arrival, which is quite unusual. Eliminating
the dummies for arrival years has no effect on the estimates for age or YSM.
As the overall regression indicates, women earn about half of what comparable
men earn, which is a striking difference. Several effects are essentially the same for
men and women: age, YSM and marital status. The rankings by country are very
similar, suggesting that country effects relate to real underlying differences in human
capital that immigrants bring or the labour market views immigrant groups similarly.
Just as for men, the coefficients on YSM do not differ significantly between countries.
In fact, significance levels are even lower, and we can only conclude that in those
early years after arrival, the speed of assimilation for women is identical across source
countries. The only exception is Chinese women, with a strong positive effect.
The differences in status are not significant, except for AMAs when we split the
sample by arrival time: In the youngest cohort, they are far behind, but in the oldest
cohort, they have a premium of more than 30%. This is a fantastic race through the
earnings distribution. The effects of time elapsed before obtaining status are quite
interesting. Years spent as an undocumented worker add experience and increase pay
(they may also signal that the individual in fact is not a refugee but an economic
migrant, as a convinced refugee would start the application procedure right away; in
that case, the additional pay may make up for initial low pay as an undocumented
worker; see Hartog and Zorlu 1999). Conversely, years spent waiting for a status
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reduce earnings, at about the same rate. Note that Statuswait covers time before
YSM, whereas Undocyears covers years parallel with YSM. YSM starts at GBA
registration, Statuswait is time spent in The Netherlands before GBA registration, and
Undocyears is time spent since GBA registration. These are substantial rates: Ayear of
undocumented work adds 13% to earnings on top of the benefits from YSM, and
another year of waiting reduces earnings by 14%. The effects are primarily for men, as
they are not significant for women. We have also tested for selection effects, by adding
a dummy for immigrants who had returned by 2001. The coefficient is not significant,
supporting our claim that in this sample, selective return migration is not an issue.
Married immigrants earn more than singles, and remarkably, on average, earnings
are highest in The Hague, the seat of government. However, if we split between men
and women, we see that men still earn most in The Hague, although women earn
most in Amsterdam.
Education has an unexpected parabolic effect. Most coefficients are statistically
significant. The returns peak for extended primary education. One might think that
this reflects selectivity, as those with higher educations might be engaged in further
education in the Dutch school system. However, the results of employment and
benefit status in Section 4 (Table 5) do not lend much support to that interpretation.
Interaction of education with YSM is insignificant for all levels of education. One
might have thought that those with the highest education have the steepest time
profiles because of complementarity between homeland education and the intensity
and returns of investment in specific Dutch human capital (Duleep and Regets
1999). However, we did not find any significant interaction between schooling and
YSM. We will return to such issues in the next section.
In columns 2 and 3, we present results separately for early and late arrivals (the
earliest and the latest that we can meaningfully define; arrival is measured by year of
IND registration; individuals may have been in the country before that, so we still
have variation on YSM). The parabolic pattern of returns by education level is
basically visible for the oldest and the youngest cohort, but precision is quite weak
for the youngest. The oldest cohort have higher benefits from education than the
youngest. It is quite remarkable that even for the oldest cohort, earnings drop for
education levels beyond extended primary. There is no need to worry about effects
of small sample size, as some 9% of the sample has higher education (for some
countries, the percentage is well above 10, see Table 2). Also remarkable is the high
pay for the least educated, some years primary, after 5 years in The Netherlands.
Thus, benefits from education clearly increase with time spent in The Netherlands,
but the pattern by level of education is surprising.
The parabolic effect of education that we found in the joint estimation is also
visible in the results for men and women separately but with some differences. For
men, returns to education behave like a step function: zero if basic education has not
been completed, some 35% for primary and extended primary and some 20% for the
higher levels. For women, a single peak stands out, a significant 41% at extended
primary education.
The core result on education is a non-monotonic effect on earnings. Highest
earnings are consistently found for immigrants with educations in the middle of the
distribution. Most remarkable is the consistent drop in earnings for immigrants with
education beyond secondary. How robust is this result?
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In column 5 of Table 8, we have reported estimation results for the case where we
drop all observations where information on education is missing. This has no effect:
Whether we know education or not is immaterial for the estimation of the coefficients
on the other variables. Covariances between education and other variables are not
responsible for the result.
We have also made estimates with a selection on observations for reliability of the
education variable, just as we did in the previous section for employment and benefit
recipient status (Table 9). For ease of comparison, we copied the basic specification
from Table 8.
The effect of selective observation by the Employment Service is remarkably
small. The estimated coefficients differ somewhat between the full sample and the
restricted sample used for model I, but in a qualitative sense, the conclusions are not
affected. The coefficients on education are very similar, except for secondary
vocational education. Immigrants with that education who visit the Employment
Service are much more successful than an average immigrant with that education. Of
course, we cannot say whether this is due to the positive influence of the
Employment Service or to higher unobserved quality of those who visit. From
inspecting results for models II and III, we can clearly conclude that our key
conclusion on education survives. Immigrants with higher education do not earn
Table 9 Selecting on reliable measurement of education: selected coefficients of panel GLS random
effect estimations of log weekly earnings, 1995–2000
C1 from T8 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
edu1_3 y 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.16
edu4_5 y 0.21* 0.23* 0.17 0.10
eduPrim 0.28*** 0.27** 0.29** 0.40**
eduPrim_ext 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.31** 0.25*
eduSec_gen 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.27** 0.20
eduSec_voc 0.21* 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.35**
eduHigh_some 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.38**









N-person 3,703 1,225 940 718 718 3,703
N-person-year 5,933 2,091 1,603 1,236 1,236 5,933
The models are estimated with the same variables as in Table 8 in addition to the education variables
presented in Table 9 but their coefficients are not presented here.
Definitions of models: C1 from T8, basic specification (all wage earners): copied from first column of
Table 8; Model I, sub-sample of individuals whose education is known; Model II, sub-sample of individuals
whose education is known both in IND and CWI registers;Model III, sub-sample of individuals whose IND
and CWI measures of education match perfectly; Model IV, sub-sample of individuals whose IND and CWI
education match perfectly, three levels of education; Model V, IV estimates using all wage earners: CWI
measure of education is used as an instrument for the IND measure of education
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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more than immigrants with lower education; education acquired at home does not
pay off in the Dutch labour market. Under reliability restriction II, which restricts the
sample to individuals whose education is known in both IND and CWI registers, the
earnings levels for immigrants are identical for all education levels beyond some
primary, with the exception of secondary vocational. Under reliability restriction III,
which captures individuals whose IND and CWI measures match perfectly, there is
equal pay for primary education, secondary vocational and some higher level edu-
cation, with all other levels earning less. Model IV is even more outspoken: There is no
earnings difference between immigrants with primary, secondary or tertiary education!
Results from instrumental variable regression are reported as model V. We used the
CWI measure of education as an instrument for the IND measure of education. As we
know that CWI education correlates with IND education and as we may assume that
CWI education does not affect the disturbances in an earnings function that would
include true education, CWI education is a good instrument (Wooldridge 2002, p. 83).
We cannot maintain the same classification of education, as the number of instru-
ments cannot be smaller than the number of instrumented variables. The instrumental
variable estimation provides less precise coefficient estimates but confirms the earlier
results that there is no monotonic increase in earnings with education level; higher
educations do not lead to higher pay. These results are robust, no matter whether we
use pooled OLS, random effect GLS or restriction to observations in 2000 only (the
table only shows random effect GLS results). We should note, however, that instru-
mental variable estimation does not guarantee consistent estimates if the measure-
ment error is not classical and that the bias cannot be signed (Kane et al. 1999).
We have considered estimation of earnings functions corrected for participation
using Heckman’s two-step procedure. A priori, we had reservations because not many
variables are available and credible exclusion restrictions are hard to determine. We
estimated a wage equation for the pooled sample with correction of standard errors for
repeated observations and separate for 2000 only. If the wage equation includes
education and country of origin, we get unconvincing results no matter how we
specify the participation equation. In particular, the effect of YSM is negative, and the
dummy for women gets a positive coefficient. We decided not to pursue this approach.
6 Dip and catch-up: testing Duleep and Regets
Duleep and Regets (1999) have used the human capital model to derive testable
predictions for the “dip and catch-up” model. In this model, immigrants start out at
an economic disadvantage relative to natives but with increasing duration in the
destination country they may catch up, with faster growth rates in wages and
employment probability. Newly arrived immigrants have lower opportunity cost of
human capital investment than natives because of their wage dip upon arrival. They
will also have higher returns to the extent that investments in the destination country
human capital increase the value of their home country human capital. Thus, they
will invest more and have faster earnings growth (and thus will catch-up). Skill
transferability between the home country and the destination country is an important
variable, as this will affect the magnitude of the initial dip. The differences in wages
and employment between source countries may be related to differences in skill
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transferability, but we do not have any additional data (e.g. on schooling systems),
and we cannot test this theory. We may note, however, that we have not found
significant interaction effects between education and country of origin, between
YSM and education or between YSM and source country in wage regressions. These
issues need further research.







































Fig. 3 Country intercepts and country slopes on YSM
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The core prediction of a negative relation between initial dip and the slope on
YSM is generally supported. In Fig. 3, we plot the dummy coefficient for a source
country against the interaction coefficient for that country with YSM, from three
regressions: the multinomial logits for employment and benefit status (Table 5) and
the basic reference regression for wages in Table 8 (model I). This means that we test
the prediction by comparing immigrants from different countries rather than
comparing immigrants with natives. For employment probability, the negative
relationship between intercept and slope is strong dependent on the observations for
Somalia and China. Both for benefits and wages, the marginal effect of length of
stay in The Netherlands is generally larger for immigrants from countries with a
smaller country intercept. Note that this is not a necessary mechanical relationship.
Although a larger gap with natives indicates greater potential for growth, there is no
need for this potential to be realised.
The prediction appears to hold also for the probability to receive social benefits.
This suggests that the hypothesis on human capital might also apply to the
investment in the social capital: getting to know your way around the institutions.
7 Conclusion and possible explanations
Our key finding is that for refugees, higher educations acquired at home generally do not
pay off during the first 5 years in the Dutch labour market. Although remarkable, the
outcome matches observations of persons active in refugee circles. We discussed our
results with the immigration department of the Ministry of Justice and with
Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland, a foundation that supports newly arrived refugees. They
were not surprised. The result may be explained in several ways. One intervening
variable may be language skills. It may very well be that for many of the occupations
associated with higher educations, understanding the Dutch language is vital, much
more so than for lower levels of education. One can do cleaning work, construction
work and much manufacturing work without good fluency in Dutch, as the results for
Turkish andMoroccan immigrants in The Netherlands testify. One cannot be a physician
without a high level of competence in Dutch. As we have no information on language
proficiency, we cannot test this, but such a hypothesis is clearly supported by Berman et
al. (2003) for Israel. It would be quite informative to observe jobs that immigrants hold
before and after immigration, but such information is not available.
A related explanation may be certification. Several occupations that require high
levels of education also require certification in the destination country. Even if one
were fluent in Dutch, a qualified physician would not be allowed to take up his
profession without obtaining new professional qualification in The Netherlands.
Certification may have elements of discrimination and job protection but may also
have a basis in country-specific required skills.5 Of course, even without
certification, there may be plain discrimination. Without further data, however, we
cannot assess the empirical importance of these explanations.
5 At the Mannheim presentation of this paper, someone remarked that his taxi driver to Stockholm airport
had been a former Iraqi army general. Perhaps his skill might have been transferable, but his occupation
certainly was not.
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Another explanation may be possible differences in health condition and true
immigration motive. Refugees usually experience violence in their home country
and may carry health-affecting consequences of repression. Moreover, there is some
doubt that every asylum seeker is a (political) refugee. Because legal immigration
from developing countries is highly restrictive, some (economic) immigrants try to
enter The Netherlands via the asylum procedure. If political engagement is correlated
with higher education levels, the population of economic immigrants who applied
and secured a refugee position is mostly from the lower end of the educational
distribution. Therefore, lower skilled refugees, if mainly economic immigrants, may
be successful in the labour market, whereas the value added of higher skills of real
refugees might be offset by health problems and traumatic experiences that hamper
their integration in a new society.
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Sample characteristics of the immigrant panel


















Weekly wages 183.60 174.88
N 13,436
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Appendix B
Variable definitions
Observations restricted to individuals aged 15–59
Arrival.year (instroom): year of registration IND
Settlement.year (vestiging): year of registration GBA
Age: age at arrival in The Netherlands, either at IND or GBA registration
YSM: years since migration; years elapsed since registration GBA
Statuswait: settlement.year minus arrival.year, if positive, zero otherwise (year of
GBA registration minus year of IND registration), hence time spent in refugee
homes waiting for a decision on the application
Undocyears: arrival.year minus settlement.year, if positive, zero otherwise (year
of IND registration minus year of GBA registration); this applies when
immigrants settled in the Netherlands without residential permission and without
applying, undocumented immigrants could register at GBA without any sanction
Table 11 Years of education by source country (mean, standard deviation)
IND CWI
Mean Std. Dev. Frequency Mean Std. Dev. Frequency
Iran 10.89 3.76 387 10.27 3.02 296
Iraq 10.33 4.79 1546 10.19 3.67 1,292
Somalia 5.72 4.75 602 8.38 2.64 354
China 6.14 3.01 316 8.04 2.22 159
Afghanistan 9.95 5.13 1,186 9.46 3.52 1,780
Sudan 10.77 4.93 364 10.18 3.36 246
Yugoslavia 9.06 3.92 780 9.71 2.88 516
Soviet Union 10.24 4.29 506 9.79 3.63 328
Other 7.77 4.50 1,757 9.16 2.95 1,039
Total 9.02 4.82 7,444 9.57 3.35 6,016
Table 12 Years of education as registered by IND and coded by ITS and as registered by CWI
(Employment Office): average years added by us
IND CWI
Years of education Years of education
No education 0 Basic 6
1–3 year Primary 3 Lower 10
4–5 year Primary 5 Intermediary 12
Primary 8 Higher vocational 15
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A status: permanent residential permission; date of granting status unknown
AMA: independent refugee not older than 18 at arrival
Preliminary status: not officially recognised as refugee, but admitted until home
country is declared safe
Naturalised: obtained Dutch citizenship in 2001
Returned: emigrated or administratively removed in 2001
Married: individual had marital status when arriving.
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